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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN C. WINTERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
(and Respondent) 
vs. 
W. S. HATCH CO., 
Defendant-Respondent 
(and Appellant) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Cases Nos.: 13997 and 14053 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a collision between two large 
trucking rigs and injury to one of the drivers. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a 6-2 jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
Winters (hereafter "Winters"), the lower court on motion of 
the defendants Hatch and Higley (hereafter "Hatch11) granted a 
judgment, notwithstanding the verdict, in favor of Hatch and 
against Winters of no cause of action, and subsequently denied 
the Hatch motion for a new trial under the provisions of 
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Rule 50(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Winters 
appealed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Hatch, 
in the alternative, appealed the denial of the motion for a 
new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Hatch seeks affirmance of the judgment in 
its favor notwithstanding the verdict. If that judgment is not 
affirmed, appellant Hatch seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the Winters 
brief is correct as to the procedural history but does not dis-
close the following uncontroverted facts adduced at trial: 
This accident occurred on February 9, 1971. Winters 
was then in the employ of F & B Truckline, driving a 60 foot 
long rig consisting of a cab-over semi tractor and a trailer 
loaded with concrete pipe, grossing about 70,000 lbs. (Exh. 
7-P, 18-P; T. 33, 95) His trip had originated three days 
earlier in Salt Lake and took him to Los Angeles, Sacramento, 
Boise, Stockton, and at the time of the accident he was enroute 
to Wyoming. (T. 34, 39, 47, 75) He had driven alone without a 
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relief driver approximately 2400 miles, averaging 13 to 17 
hours driving each day. (Exh.45-D, 73-D; T.45, 83, 84) 
The Hatch rig consisted of a cab-over semi tractor 
pulling 2 silver painted tankers loaded with caustic soda. 
(Exh.4P) Defendant DeRoy Higley was the chief driver and 
Doran Higley the assistant driver. The rig also grossed 
about 70,000 lbs., and was about 58 feet long, 8 feet wide, 
and 9 feet high. (Exh.66-D, T.257) It was equipped with a 
tachograph which permanently recorded its speed on a time 
chart. (T.407, 408, 350; Exh.69-D) Their trip, a regular run, 
had originated in Salt Lake and proceeded to the Oakland Bay 
area. They were in the process of returning back to Salt Lake 
City at the time of the accident. DeRoy Higley drove the rig 
to the truck stop involved where Doran Higley took over the 
driving. (T. 402) 
The accident occurred on 1-80 about 24 miles east 
of Reno. (T. 135). The highway consisted of two lanes in each 
direction divided by a wide strip of median ground. (T. 127; 
Exh. 63-D, 30-P, 37-P, 28-P, 46-D) The road was dry. It was 
dark but clear. (T.237) Neither driver could see where to 
drive without the assistance of lights. (T. 89, 270, 405, 407) 
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There were no street or other lights in the vicinity of the 
truck stop. One could see lights on a vehicle about one mile 
away. (T. 193-198, 366, 238, 243, 398, 399) 
Winters1 approach to the accident site was on a 
straight stretch about one mile long with a slight dip about 
a half mile back from the truck stop. (T. 85) There were no 
obstructions to Winters' view of the truck stop area, except 
briefly for a lfTruck Stop" sign on his approach to the area 
and any traffic that he might have passed. (Exh. 37-P, 40-P, 
33-P, 32-P, 47-D, 46-D, 49-D, 50-D, 30-P, 31-P, 25-P, 28-P, 
72-D; T. 92, 196, 197, 224, 379, 380) Abreast of the truck 
stop area was a sign which stated "Merging Traffic11, located 
about 1000 feet before the collision area* (Exh. 52-D,63-D; T.328) 
The Hatch rig had stopped in the middle of the truck 
stop. (T. 405, Exh. 30-P) Its head lights were then turned 
off but its parking and clearance lights were left on. (T. 260, 
270, 271, 405) Both of the Higleys got out of the tractor. 
They checked their tires and lights and drank some coffee. 
After about five minutes they got back in their cab. Doran 
Higley started the tractor, turned on his head lights so he 
could see and, with DeRoy Higley in the passenger seat, they 
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started out of the parking area back on to the highway. (T. 270, 
402, 405) Their approach to the highway was over about a 1400 
foot distance along a merging lane which phased into the high-
way at an 8° angle. (T. 328, 325; Exh. 22-P, 35-P) 
On the rear of each of the Hatch tankers there were 
4 taillights, 2 red reflectors, 3 clearance lights, and letter-
ing on a white painted background, as well as additional lights 
and reflectors along the sides of the tankers. (T. 147, Exh. 
4-P, 13-P, 19-P and 67-P) Neither of the Hatch drivers re-
called seeing the Winters1 rig until after the collision. (T.263, 
402) The Hatch rig accelerated at a gradual and constant rate 
because of the lack of baffles in the tanker to restrain the 
movement of the liquid cargo. (T. 284, 406, 407) It proceeded 
on the highway into the outside lane, the front end proceeding 
at least 150 feet and the rear end at least 90 feet onto the 
highway before it was hit in the rear. (Exh. 68-P, 63-D, T. 321, 
324-326) The tachograph on the Hatch rig established that it had 
steadily accelerated from its stop and had attained its maximum 
speed of 23 mph at the time of the collision. It was then pushed 
forward to a speed of 47 mph before coming to rest. (T.350,354,407; 
Exh. 69-D) 
Winters testified that he had been proceeding in the 
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outside lane for some time before and at the time of the 
collision. (T. 87) His lights were on low beam and would 
reflect off the Hatch rig about 1000 feet away even if the 
Hatch rig had no lights on it. (Exh. 68-P, 1-P; T. 89,90) 
He was traveling between 60 and 70 MPH. (T. 91, 92; Exh. 62-D) 
He vaguely recalled passing a truck not far from the accident 
site. (T. 48, 49) He did not recall seeing the "Truck Stop" 
signs or "Merging Traffic" sign. (T. 85) Nor did he observe 
the Hatch rig until an instant before the collision when he 
observed "the back of a truck or lights" "or a reflection off 
of something." (T. 48,49) There was no evidence of any braking 
attempt by Winters. (T. 199,200) 
Nevada Highway Patrolman Frei investigated the acci-
dent that night and took photographs and measurements. (T.133) 
He was called as a witness by Winters. Frei confirmed that the 
physical evidence at the scene of the accident established that 
both vehicles were squarely in the outside lane at the time of 
the collision. (T. 222) David Lord, Winters1 expert witness, 
examined the scene of the accident and the physical evidence. 
He agreed that the collision took place in the outside lane but 
felt that Winters1 rig was at that time changing from the inside 
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to the outside lane. (Exh. 68-P; T. 323, 342, 343) The road-
way crowned from a point in the center so that the eastbound 
right hand or outside lane dropped in elevation down to the 
right shoulder. (T. 223) 
The only known witness to the accident was Douglas 
McNaught/ (T. 237) He was driving a car westbound approach-
ing the Hatch and Winters1 rigs. He was familiar with the 
area. His headlights were on low beam. (T. 239) He initially 
observed the two westbound rigs with their lights on approaching 
him about a mile away. (T. 239) He could see that they were 
trucks. (T. 238) He thought Winters1 rig was in the process of 
passing the Hatch rig when he observed Winters1 rig hit the rear 
of the Hatch rig as he, McNaught, was abreast of them. (T. 238, 
243, 244) There was no other traffic in the area. (T. 239) 
Winters1 grill left an imprint in the rear Hatch 
tanker. (Exh. 4-P, 19-P; T. 322) The transmission from Winters1 
tractor dropped and gouged the pavement as his rig moved 262 feet 
to rest. (T. 159) The Hatch rig was brought to rest about 1500 
feet down the highway. (T. 159) 
The following diagram summarizes and illustrates the 
physical circumstances,as favorably for Winters as the evidence 
permits, during the last 7 seconds before the collision: 
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1. At 23 mph Hatch traveled 33.8 feet per second and consumed at least 
7 seconds in traveling from point A to point D, a distance of over 
240 feet. 
2. In that same 7 seconds Winters would have traveled 617 feet at 60 mph, 
or 720 feet at 70 mph. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE PLAINTIFF WINTERS WAS CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The main thrust of Winters1 position was an attempt 
to excuse him from seeing and hitting the rear of the Hatch rig 
because of some obstruction to Winters1 view or because the 
Hatch rig did not have any lights. 
His counsel indicated to the jury: 
lf(T)here will be no testimony from Mr. Winters 
with respect to the accident iself." (T. 20) 
nMr. David Lord will explain in detail what 
each of these photographs shows . . . in those 
photographs you will observe that the area 
wherein the accident occurred is an area where-
in an individual or truck, most likely cannot 
be seen from an area at the bottom of the hill 
heading to that parking area.11 (T. 21) 
"Again I submit to you the key to this case is 
what could Mr. Winters have done other than 
that which is shown by the evidence to have 
been done. Admittedly we have no testimony 
from Mr. Winters . . . I think the only con-
tention that can be made is that the physical 
evidence must be relied upon . . . to show to 
you what occurred.11 (T. 22,23) 
In trying to explain the accident to a Nevada high-
way patrolman about 17 days after the accident, Mr. Winters 
recognized that he should have seen the Hatch rig if he was 
attentive and awake. At that time he stated: 
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ffI was traveling east on 1-80 in the right travel 
lane at approximately 62-63 mph. All I remember 
is seeing the rear of the truck and the impact as 
I struck the other truck in the rear. I donft 
know if the other truck was traveling slower or 
if it had any tail lights, but I believe that it 
might not have had any tail lights as I should 
have seen them due to the fact that I had just 
left the Evergreen truck stop after 4 or 5 hours 
sleep and had just eaten . . .If (T. 399, Exh. 62-D) 
At the trial, Winters acknowledged that he did not 
recall whether he was sleepy just before the accident. (T. 95) 
In his published deposition of April 26, 1974, Winters 
testified as follows: 
flQ. Were you sleepy? 
A. I canft say that I was. You know, I shouldnft 
have been at least. I don't really know. I 
doubt it.11 (Winters1 Deposition p. 18) 
flQ. Assuming now that a tractor and tanker trailer 
had pulled out onto that highway from the shoul-
der and gotten itself completely on the road in 
front of you with no lights on it, that is no 
electric lights burning, -- — is there anything 
that would have prevented you from seeing that 
truck as it approached and entered the highway 
as you were coming down the highway? 
A. Nothing that I know of, sir. 
Q. In other words you think your lights would have 
picked up a vehicle ahead of you within the 
range of your headlights, such a sized vehicle 
A. I imagine so." (Winters1 Deposition pp. 21, 22) 
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flQ. Well, can you think of anything else that 
would help me understand how this accident 
happened or why it happened? 
A. Not really, sir. I can't understand it 
myself.11 (Winters Deposition p. 32) 
At trial Mr. Winters testified as follows: 
nQ. O.K. Now, do you recall the impact, the 
accident itself? 
A. No, sir. The last thing I can say for sure 
that I remember was going by a truck not far 
from there. I couldn't say exactly how far 
back it was, but I can almost definitely say 
I did pass -- remember definitely passing 
that truck, like I say it's quite vague. 
Q. Then what next occurred, if you know? 
A. Then I — 1 don't really know if it's trying 
to remember so hard that it's my own imagin-
ation, but it seems like I can remember seeing 
the back of a truck or lights or something . . . 
and the next thing I knew it was -- well, that 
was Tuesday. The next thing I knew it was 
Sunday when I woke up in the hospital. 
Q. O.K. Now, the back of the truck, or the lights 
that you seem to recall remembering, can you 
describe to the Jury what you recall? 
A. Just — I can't really other than it just seems 
like I can remember, you know, an instant where 
I saw lights or a reflection off of something. 
I couldn't really say." (T. 47-49) 
flQ. and as you are driving down the road at night 
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as you were that night, there is nothing to 
obstruct your view of — of a truck that would 
be parked in that parking area, is there? 
A. Nothing I can think of, no.u (T. 85) 
As Winters himself indicated, even if he had passed 
another vehicle in the outside lane, from his position in the 
elevated ftcab-overff he would have a clear view to his right 
front of the Hatch rig from the time that Winters was abreast 
of any such vehicle in the outside lane. From that point Winters 
would have proceeded at 60 to 70 MPH over a substantial distance 
until he was at least a couple of truck lengths or "a couple of 
hundred feet1' in front of such a vehicle before starting to pull 
to his right and into the outside lane. (T. 91) Such a passing 
movement would not block his vision for more than a moment or 
two. (T. 91,92) Mr. McNaught who was approaching the two rigs, 
and in a perfect position to see whether any other vehicle was 
in the vicinity, testified that there was no other such vehicle 
in the area. Thus a jury could not reasonably find that there 
was any obstruction to Winters' view of an observable object to 
his front. 
Was the Hatch rig observable? The only credible 
testimony was that it was lighted. Both of the Hatch drivers 
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so testified. McNaught observed the Hatch rig lighted about 
a mile ahead of him before the collision. Even Winters remem-
bered seeing !flights or something11 an instant before the col-
lision. (T. 47-49) All of the persons present that night, 
including Winters, confirmed that it was so dark that one 
could not see where to drive without artificial lighting. 
(T. 89) The Hatch rig could not have traveled over 1400 feet 
and back onto the highway without its headlights on. If its 
headlights were on, then its taillights connected to the same 
switch were on. (See § 41-6-121, U.C.A. 1953, and Nevada Revised 
Statutes 484.551 requiring head and tail lights to be wired to-
gether.) The only credible evidence is that the Hatch rig was 
lighted at all times as it merged onto the highway. 
Even if one assumed that the Hatch rig did not have 
any lights on it, it would still constitute such a substantial 
and obvious object in front of Winters that he cannot be ex-
cused from seeing it. The rear of the tanker had red reflectors 
and was painted silver and had white painted areas on the rear. 
These would have reflected for a substantial distance ahead. 
(See Exh. 19-P, 13-P, 4-P and 67-P) As Mr. Winters testified: 
lfQ# Allright. Now, assuming it had no lights, 
even the clearance or marker lights. You 
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have had your lights on? 
A. Right. 
Q. What would your headlights have picked up? 
A. Well, once you get close enough the lights 
of the truck — or not -- I mean the reflec-
tion off either the tanks or the reflectors 
on the truck. 
Q. And how far away would you have expected your 
lights to pick up an object ahead? 
A. . I don't know what the distance would be. It 
depends on sometimes --if you are running 
on low beams or high beams or if you have 
also got road lights below that which give 
you a lot more -- with just my headlights on, 
I donft know, about 1000 feet . . .ff 
lfQ. Now, is it true that normally you try to drive 
at such a speed that if your lights pick some-
thing up ahead that you are able to stop when 
those lights pick up an object ahead of you 
or slow down? 
A. Pretty much, yes sir. 
Q. But there is a relationship between the speed 
you are going and how far ahead your lights 
will illuminate things? 
•A. Right." (T. 89, 90) 
Mr. Lord, the expert for Mr. Winters, established that 
the Hatch rig consumed at least 55 seconds to move from its 
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stopped position in the rest area to the initial point of 
impact. (Exh. 74-P, 73-D; T. 358, 361) The Hatch rig was 
proceeding at a very slight angle (8°) as it merged into the 
outside eastbound lane. 
For the last 40 seconds or so of travel of each 
vehicle before impact they would have each been readily 
within the line of sight of one another. (Exh. 72-D, T.424, 
428) 
Lord established that Winters should have been able 
to bring his rig to a complete stop from the time he sensed 
danger in a maximum of 620 feet at a speed of 64 MPH. (T. 386) 
Obviously less distance and time would be involved in slowing 
to 23 MPH or changing to the available inside lane. An anal-
ysis of known speed of the Winters' rig between 60 and 70 MPH 
and the Hatch rig accelerating from 0 to 23 MPH establishes 
that the left front of the Hatch rig and its headlights must 
have entered the outside lane at least 7 seconds before the 
collision. At that point Winters1 rig would be at least 617 
feet from the point of collision. (Exh. 63-D; T. 370, 371, 
379, 380) The normal reaction time for Mr. Winters would 
have been 3/4 of a second in which he would have traveled 
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anywhere from 70 to 80 feet. (T. 284, 385) Yet, there is 
no evidence or suggestion either from Winters himself or 
from the physical evidence at the scene of the accident, 
that Winters made any effort to avoid the collision. Although 
counsel for Winters used Lord's analysis of the position of 
the Wintersf rig moving from left to right as an indication 
that Winters was turning to his right so as to avoid a colli-
sion, such an explanation defies logic and experience as well 
as Winters1 own testimony. Certainly any attempt he would 
have made to avoid the accident would have involved braking, 
a sharp turning movement, or some effort to stay in or move 
back into the inside, open lane. Any left to right movement 
of the Winters1 rig as depicted by Lord on Exhibit 68-P is only 
consistent with a voluntary non-emergency steering, or the 
rig driving to its right with an inattentive or momentarily 
sleeping driver. 
Winters had every reason to anticipate the presence 
of the Hatch rig. Winters would have taken about one minute 
going between 60 and 70 mph to travel the approximately one 
mile in the straight-of-way leading up to the truck stop and 
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accident scene, Mr. Lord and Officer Frei, both of whom 
examined the scene of the accident in the day and night time, 
as well as Mr. Winters, agreed that there was nothing to ob-
struct Winters1 view of the truck stop over that distance 
with the exception of one of the two "Truck Stop" signs, 
which would have constituted but a momentary and partial ob-
struction. Those two signs, and the "Truck Merging11 sign 
about 1000 feet before the point where the merging lane re-
entered the highway, should have particularly alerted Mr. 
Winters to the posibility of slow moving, heavy rigs getting 
on the highway in front of him. Winters acknowledged that if 
he had seen the Hatch rig approaching to merge into the high-
way that he, Winters, would have "slowed some and moved to the 
left." (T. 87,88) 
As Officer Frei characterized the situation: 
"It is perfectly obvious, or something as --
I mean the lights. It is extremely dark in 
that area. Any lights, if there was only 
one set of lights on the road, would show 
up for miles, because of the darkness." 
(T. 217) 
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This court has explained the purpose of motions for 
a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
as follows: 
nIts function is to permit the trial judge to sub-
mit the case to a jury for their determination, 
then if the verdict goes adverse to the moving 
party, he can, when there is more time for deliber-
Vation, reexamine and rule upon whether a jury ques-
tion exists.,! Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 
P.2d 855 (1953) 
The instant case did involve a four day trial with ex-
tensive testimony and evidence. A careful analysis and abstract 
of the evidence and testimony fairly establishes that Winters 
had a prolonged and clear opportunity to see the Hatch rig ahead 
of him, that Winters failed to observe it and avoid it, and there 
is no justification, explanation or evidence to support his run-
ning into the rear of the Hatch rig other than his inattention, 
for whatever reason. 
In a number of cases this court has approved or caused 
the setting aside of jury verdicts as a matter of law involving 
vehicle collisions in day light [Henderson v. Meyer, Utah 2d 
_ _ , 533 P.2d 290 (1975); Conklin V. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 
2d 437 (1948); Brock V. Ward, 28 Utah 2d 303, 501 P.2d 1207 (1972); 
Phillips v. Tooele City, 28 Utah 2d 223, 500 P.2d 669 (1972); 
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Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 336 P.2d 59 (1959)] and at 
night [Dalley v. Mid-Western, 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309 (1932); 
Shiba v. Weiss, 3 Utah 2d 256, 282 P.2d 341 (1955); Johnson v. 
Syme, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 P.2d 468 (1957).] 
Dalley involved a car striking an unlighted truck at 
night stopped on the shoulder of the road and protruding onto the 
highway 5-1/2 feet. The car was traveling 25 mph and could have 
been brought to a stop in 50 feet. The driver of the car did not 
see the truck until it was 15 or 20 feet away. The car operator 
applied his brakes and attempted to turn to the left. The trial 
court's non-suit of the plaintiff was affirmed by this court, 
which stated: 
flA truck such as that in to which plaintiff ran 
on the night in question is a substantial object. 
. . . As plaintiff approached the place where 
the truck was standing on the night in question, 
the highway was straight and level for a distance 
of at least a mile. The truck was directly in 
front of him and in his course of travel. Accor-
ding to his testimony he was keeping a constant 
lookout ahead. If he was not keeping a lookout 
ahead, he was guilty of negligence in failing to 
do so. There was nothing to obstruct his view. 
It was an ordinary, clear, quiet summer night 
with no moon. So far as appears there was nothing 
to divert his attention from the road in front of 
him.,f 
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In Shiba a car ran into an unlighted parked truck at 
night. The occupants of the car were killed. The only evidence 
was that the accident occurred on a straight stretch of highway 
without obstruction to the view of the occupants of the car. 
The driver of the car was held to be negligent as a matter of 
law. 
Johnson v, Syme involved a plaintiff driving 50 mph 
on a 4-lane highway and colliding with a car which proceeded, 
without slowing or stopping for a stop sign, on to the highway at 
night with its headlights on. The plaintiff acknowledged that 
she did not see the other car until it was 20 or 30 feet in 
front of her, although the witness following behind the plain-
tiff observed the other car approach and travel past the stop 
sign into the intersection. This court stated: . 
"Under such circumstances we cannot but conclude 
that plaintiff either looked and failed to see 
the obvious, or failed to look at all, and, as 
a matter of law negligently contributed to her 
own injuries . . .n 
In Brock v. Ward, a jury verdict for the plaintiff was 
reversed by this court on the determination that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent. The plaintiff acknowledged seeing 
a parked truck a quarter of a mile away before hitting it. The 
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court commented: 
"Under such circumstances it is impossible to 
understand how the jury could have concluded 
else than that she was chargeable with negligence 
barring recovery/ Having done otherwise, we think, 
was the product of conjecture and that the trial 
court should not have given the case to the jury 
at all, but should have found that the plaintiff 
was negligent as a matter of law.11 
In Richards v. Anderson this court made a careful 
analysis of the time, speed and distance factors in a collision 
involving a motorist proceeding from behind a stop sign onto a 
main highway. In affirming the lower courtfs summary judgment, 
this court commented: 
"The plaintiff advances the excuse that the two 
cars stopped in the lanes to his right obscured 
his view of the defendant. The fact is that 
these cars are each about six feet wide. They 
thus occupied only two such spots in a total 
width of 33 feet. While it was necessary for 
plaintiff to be watching his own lane ahead, 
his vision was not like looking through a pipe 
or a tunnel. His angle of vision would take in 
the moving objects in the adjacent lanes, par-
ticularly a moving object such as defendant's 
car, had he been looking. 
"It is a well settled rule that one may not be 
heard to say that he did not see what was plain 
to be seen. He either failed to look, or saw 
and failed to heed, either of which makes him 
negligent." 
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POINT II: THE HATCH DRIVERS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT, OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE ANY NEGLIGENCE OF THE HATCH DRIVERS WAS NOT 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Although the jury could have found that reasonable care 
would have required the Hatch drivers to see the oncoming Wintersf 
rig, we submit that reasonable men could not require the Hatch 
drivers to refrain from merging on the highway had they seen the 
approach of the Winters1 rig. When the Hatch rig started to merge 
on the highway, Winters was more than 400 feet to the rear of that 
point and well over 600 feet from the ultimate point of the colli-
sion. The inside lane was open. The Hatch drivers were entitled 
to enter the highway and expect Winters to yield. As Winters him-
self testified: 
f,QV Now, if you had been traveling along at 60 or 
70 miles per hour and you had seen another rig 
such as yours or like this Hatch rig that was 
pulling out of that truck stop and coming into 
the -- coming along the passage way that merges 
into that highway and you had seen that truck 
ahead of you some two, three thousand feet ahead, 
what would you ordinarily have done? What was 
your normal practice? 
A. If I had seen that they had -- say a small 
light on indicating they were coming out on 
to the road, I would have probably merged to 
the left.11 (T. 87) 
ffQ. But assuming you were even closer — say you 
were within a thousand feet or fifteen hundred 
feet and you saw ahead of you a truck obviously 
coming from the truck stop area and starting 
to merge into the freeway, what would you 
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have done, say, you are just a thousand feet 
back and it's moving slowly, maybe 20 miles 
an hour and you are doing 60 to 70, what would 
have been your ordinary practice as a truck driver 
if you had seen that? 
A. I would have slowed some and moved to the left 
if I could tell they were coming on to the 
road. 
Q. Now, is it true that particularly among truck 
drivers, you appreciate the fact that these big 
rigs don't start up and accelerate like passen-
ger cars moving out of truck stops? 
A. That's right. 
Q. If they are loaded and that often they have 
some problem in gaining speed. That is, you 
don't just pick up speed like that in these 
big rigs that have a gross load weight of 
70, 80,000 pounds, do you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And as truckers, do I have a right understand-
ing -that you have a courtesy among truckers, 
that you, if anything, give another truck driver 
an opportunity to get back into the flow of 
traffic. You don't crowd him, push him? 
A. No, sir. You wouldn't do that anyway, whether 
it was a car or a truck. 
Q. But you appreciate with trucks particularly 
that they just have more difficulty gaining 
momentum to get into the flow of traffic? 
A. Yes, sir." (T. 87,88) 
Thus, the Hatch drivers were entitled to expect Winters 
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to yield by merely staying in the inside lane, slowing or 
changing to the inside lane within the time and distance that 
Winters had to control the situation -- a minimum of over 600 
feet and 7 seconds. 
In Velasquez v. Greyhound, 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 
989, (1961) this court considered the question of proximate 
cause when a Greyhound bus drove into a truck stopped partially 
in the outside lane of a divided highway with its clearance 
lights, stop lights and blinkers on. The bus driver observed 
the stopped truck about a half mile away and yet collided with 
it. The bus driver momentarily lost consciousness by either 
falling asleep or blacking out. This court stated: 
11
 (T)hat even where there is a negligently created 
hazard . . . and a later actor observed, or cir-
cumstances are such that he could not fail to 
observe, the condition, but he nevertheless neg-
ligently failed to avoid it, the latter negligence 
would be an independent, intervening cause and 
therefor the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent, (p. 991) 
ff(W)e think it is not reasonably to be foreseen 
that an oncoming driver . . . would see (or fail 
to see) this large, well-lighted truck so parked 
upon the highway, and with at least one and one-
half usable traffic lanes to his left, nevertheless 
run into it. The trial court was correct in so 
concluding and entering a judgment in favor of 
Interstate Motor Lines as a matter of law on the 
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grounds that the negligence of Greyhound was 
the sole proximate cause of the collision.n 
(p. 992) 
In Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514 (1948) 
this court stated that a driver approaching an intersection from 
400 to 500 feet away traveling at a speed which would require six 
to seven and a half seconds to reach the intersection was under 
a duty to yield the right-of-way to a motorist proceeding onto 
the highway from behind a stop sign. 
APPELLANT HATCH'S BRIEF FOR A NEW TRIAL 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
If this court does not affirm the lower court's judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, then appellant Hatch requests 
that it be granted a new trial on the grounds that (A) the trial 
court erred in its instructions to the jury, (B) counsel for 
Winters made prejudicial statements to the jury, and (C) the 
trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony. Each of 
these points will be set forth factually and argued in turn. 
POINT A: THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY. 
Hatch requested but the lower court refused to instruct 
the jury as follows: 
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"5. The plaintiff was under the following duties: 
• • • 
(c) to drive at such rate of speed and to keep 
his vehicle under such control that he could 
stop within the distance the highway was 
illuminated by its lights so that he could 
avoid a collision.ff (R. 70) 
In the absence of unusual circumstances, the Nevada 
Supreme Court has uniformally approved that instruction: 
"It is the duty of a driver to drive at such a rate 
of speed and to keep the vehicle under such control 
that,, to avoid a collision, he can stop within the 
distance the highway is illuminated by its lights." 
Burlington v. Wilson, 61 Nev. 22, 110 P.2d 211, 
114 P. 2d 1094 (1941); Rocky Mountain v. Johnson, 
78 Nev. 44, 369 P.2d 198 (1962); Tracy v. Pollock, 
79 Nev. 361, 385 P.2d 340 (1963). 
The failure of the lower court to so instruct permitted 
the jury to determine, erroneously, that Winters had no duty gen-
erally to drive within the range of his headlights. 
Hatch also requested and the lower court refused to 
instruct the jury as follows: 
"6. The fact that one has the right-of-way does 
not excuse him from the exercise of ordinary 
care." (R. 71) 
This instruction is commonly employed as provided in 
JIFU and has been approved in a number of cases such as Hickok v. 
Skinner, supra. 
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The failure to so instruct permitted the jury to 
assume, erroneously, that Winters had an absolute right-of-way 
under the circumstances. 
POINT B: COUNSEL FOR WINTERS MADE PREJUDICIAL STATE-
MENTS TO THE JURY. 
In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for 
Winters stated: 
,!(T)here will be testimony in this Court room 
indicating that the driver of the Hatchco rig, 
some eight months subsequent to this accident 
had surgery performed for the removal of 
cataracts from his eyes, and I anticipate 
testimony will be submitted to you with respect 
to what effects cataracts -- what effects cat-
aracts have upon a person1s eyes with respect 
to day and/or night vision.11 (T. 23) 
No such testimony or evidence was produced or offered. 
However Doran Higley, the Hatch driver, did appear at trial wear-
ing glasses with very thick lenses, (p.9, Transcript of March 5, 
1975 hearing) The comment of counsel and the appearance of Mr. 
Higley permitted the jury to unduly consider the possibility that 
Mr. Higley was greatly restricted in his visual capacity at the 
time of the accident. We submit that such a situation was 
patently prejudicial to Hatch. 
In Howsley v. Kendallf 376 S.W.2d 562, the court granted 
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a new trial, stating: 
MIt is our opinion that from the time the charge 
was made someone else was testifying through the 
lips of Robert Myers, coupled with the statement 
as to a fbattery of lawyers1 the petitioners1 
case was irretrievably prejudiced. An assertion 
of facts having no evidentiary basis were placed 
before the jury and these asserted facts were in 
turn made the basis of an inflammatory appeal. 
No instruction of the trial court could have 
removed the prejudicial effects of the argument 
and hence no objection was necessary to preserve 
the error." 
See also Tri-Stake Transit v. Westbrook, 180 S.W.2d 121. 
POINT C: THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
During trial, Hatch1s expert, Fred Wagner, was not 
permitted to answer the following questions: 
i 
i 
flQ. Assuming those were tire marked left by the 
F & B truck would those be consistent in any I 
TA7£1\7 TA71 t"h i~ln& H v n t r o v -Fra 1 1 n-no- o o l o /an r\-^ A r\ r? -? •*-* n- ? ' * ™ way wi the driver f lli g as eep or dozing?"
(T. 428) 
ffQ. Assuming the F & B trucks were proceeding on 
the roadway as indicated in these photographs -
and that the driver fell asleep or drowsed, I 
what would be -~" (T. 429) 
Thereupon the court permitted counsel to make the fol- I 
lowing proffer of testimony: 
11
 (I)f the witness Fred Wagner were permitted to 
respond to the questions directed to him to the 
i 
i 
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..effect what in his opinion would be normal move-
ment and probable movement of the F & B truck, 
assuming it were traveling between 60 and 70 mph 
down the road in proximity to and just west of the 
point of collision, if the driver drowsed or slept 
and his hands relaxed on the wheel, where would 
the roadway direcc -- where would the truck go on 
the roadway, he would respond that in his opinion 
the truck would tend to drift to its right and off 
to the right shoulder, consistent with the tire 
'marks shown at the scene of the accident in the 
photographs." (T. 429) 
Mr. Lord, the expert of Winters, was permitted to infer 
that at the time of the collision Winters was voluntarily steering 
his rig from left to right in an attempt to avoid the Hatch rig. 
(T. 343, Exh. 68-P) In order for the jury to appreciate what 
could have caused Winters1 rig to be moving at such an angle, it 
required the assistance of an expert in order to analyze the nat-
ural movements of a vehicle under the circumstances. There was 
an obvious need in this instance for scientific knowledge, exper-
tize and experience to aid the jury to a correct and just result. 
See Abramson v. Levinson, 250 N.E.2d 796. 
In Thompson v. Kost, 181 S.W.2d 445, the court stated: 
"Experts may testify as to the effect on a car of 
a tire blowing out, but it was not competent for 
them to testify as to whether this blow-out caused 
the wreck.11 
Hatch sought nothing more from its expert than an opinion 
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as to the effect of Winters relaxing his control on the steer-
ing wheel . The failure of the trial court to permit such testi-
mony prejudiced Hatch's presentation of a substantial aspect of 
its defense, 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law in failing to see and avoid colliding with the rear of the 
Hatch rig. The Hatch drivers were not negligent in merging 
onto the highway even if they had been aware of the presence of 
the Winters1 rig, and in any event, any negligence of Hatch was 
not a proximate cause of the collision. This court should affirm 
the lower court's judgment in favor of the defendant Hatch not-
withstanding the verdict. In the alternative Hatch should be 
granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY E. JENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & 
EVANS 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent (and Appellant) 
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